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Non-Immigrant Labor Policy in the United States
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Cornell University
The employment of foreign workers as a supplement to the available
domestic labor force has been a recurrent public policy issue throughout much
of the history of the United States. Under specified circumstances, non-
immigrant workers have been allowed legal access to the American labor market.
They should not be confused with illegal immigrants who do not have such a
pri vil ege. The legislative and the administrative actions that have authorized
or permitted non-immigrant programs have generally been shrouded in controversy.
The concerns have centered both upon the economic effects that non-immigrant
workers have on working conditions for citizen workers and, also, on the special
restrictions that are often imposed on the non-immigrants which would be con-
sidered both unfair and often illegal if applied to citizen workers.
If examined individually at different points in history, the nation's
non-immigrant labor policy would seem to be the result of ad hoc reactions to
--
events of their time. A long term perspective, however, reveals that there
are patterns to these programs and policies. Recognition of these themes and
characteristics is essential to any effort to evaluate the efficacy of contemporary
non-immigrant policy as well as any future proposals of a similar nature.
The Antecedent Programs: The Pre-1952 Experience
The initial effort to establish by law the right of A~erican employers
to recruit and to hire foreign labor to work in the United States was the
Contract Labor Act of 1864. Enacted as a wartime measure, it was repealed
in 1868 although the practice by private groups continued with little
interruption for many years afterward. During this period, the nation had
essentially an open immigration policy to anyone except the Chinese. Thus,
2technically speaking, the contract labor era does not represent a non-immigrant
program. Those persons who were recruited were encouraged to stay as permanent
immigrants. It was practiced in an era that preceded the establishment of immi-
gration ceilings and country quotas. Although contract labor was banned in
1885, it laid the conceptual foundation for subsequent non-immigrant programs.
Only months after the United States enacted the most restrictive immi-
gration legislation in its history up until that time--the Immigration Act of
1917, the first publicly sanctioned foreign labor program was initiated.l In
response to strong pressure from the large agricultural employers of the Southwest,
Congress included in the Act a provision which would allow entry of "temporary
workers" from Western hemisphere nations who were "othen-lise inadmissible."
The Secretary of Labor could exempt such persons from the head tax required
of each immigrant and the ban on any immigrants over age 16 who could not read.
In May 1917, with the nation officially at war, such an order was issued for
the creation of a temporary farm worker program with Mexico. Later, some workers
were permitted to be employed in non-farm work. When the program was announced,
so were a number of rules and regulations. Ostensibly, these rules were designed
to protect both citizen workers and Mexican workers as well as to assure that
the Mexicans returned home after their work was completed. But, as has become
the historic pattern with these types of programs, "these elaborate rules
were unenforced...2
The temporary worker program was enacted during World War I as being in
the national interest. It was subsequently extended until 1922--we11 after
the war had ended in 1918. It was terminated because its rationale as a
national defense policy could no longer be maintained. Also, organized labor
contended that the program undermined the economic welfare of citizen workers.
There were other critics who believed that there were no labor shortages but
3only opportunistic employers who wished to tap a secure source of cheap and
docile workers for their own private gain. During its lifespan, 76,862
Mexican workers were admitted to the United States of whomless than half
returned to Mexico.3
The Mexican Labor Program
With the advent of World War II, the military manpower requirements of
the United States and its related manufacturing labor needs led to assertions
that another labor shortage existed in the agricultural sector. The growers
of the Southwest foresaw these developments and they unsuccessfully requested
in 1941 that a contract labor program be established by the federal government.
By mid-1942, however, the U.S. government had come to favor the program, but
the government of Mexico balked at the prospect of a formal inter-governmental
agreement. The unregulated hiring of Mexican citizens by foreign nations is
prohibited by the Mexican Constitution of 1917.4 Moreover, in the 1940s the
Mexican economy was flourishing; Mexican workers feared that they might be
drafted; there were bitter memories of the efforts to IIrepatriate" Mexicans
during the 1930s; and there was knowledge of the discriminatory treatment ac-
corded people of Mexican ancestry throughout the Southwest.
Negotiations between the two governments ultimately resulted in a formal
agreement in August 1942 which launched the Mexican Labor Program--more pop-
5
ularly known as the IIbracero program. II Included within an omnibus appropriations
act known as P.L. 45, the program was extended by subsequent enactments until
food, medical needs, and wage rates. Included within an omnibus appropriations
act known as P.L. 45, the program was extended by subsequent enactments until
1947. Braceros were limited exclusively to agricultural work. When the agree-
ment ended December 31, 1947, the program was continued informally and without
4regulation until 1951. In that year, under the guise of another war-related
labor shortage, the bracero program was revived by P.L. 78.
Under P.L. 78, only Mexican' workers could be contracted for work in the
United States. The scale of the program can be seen in Table 1. Employers
were required to pay the prevailing agricultural wage, to provide free housing,
to provide adequate meals at a reasonable charge, and to pay all transportation
costs from the work site to the government reception centers near the border.
These requirements were seldom met.6 Braceros were exempt from both social
security and income taxes which meant that they received more income than
would a citizen worker employed at the identical money wage rate.
In Mexico, the national government determined the actual allocation process
by which the number of workers were to be chosen from among several of its states.
The state governments, in turn, made similar decisions for their cities and
other political subdivisions. The Mexican government sought to spread out
geographically the job opportunities rather than to simply select workers from
the available labor pools in the border towns. It feared that otherwise there
would be a mass internal migration to the border region. There were far more
applicants in every designated labor market than there were available slots.
Corruption in the selection process became widespread at the local level.
Potential workers were often forced to pay a "mordida" (i.e., a bribe or literally
lIa bite") if they wished to be chosen.
The bracero program demonstrated precisely how border labor policies can
adversely affect citizen workers in the United States--especially, in this
case, the Chicanos who composed the bulk of the southwestern agricultural labor
force. Agricultural employment in the Southwest was removed from competition
with the non-agricultural sector. At the program's peak, almost one-half
Table I Fond gn \'!orkel's Admit ted 5. for TeiiJpOI'l1ryElilployt:lent in U.S.
Agriculture by Year and r~Jtional ity
1942-1973 a
Brit; sh \':est Jllpanese
Yeat' Total f.iexican Indies (including Canadian and Spa i n
--
BahaliJd) Filipino
----
1942 4,203 4,203
1943 65,624 52,098 13,526
1944 83 , 206 62,170 19,622 1,414
1945 72,900 49,454 19,391 4,055
1946 51,347 32,043 13,771 5,533
1947 30,775 19,632 3,722 7,421
.1948 44,916 35,345 3,671 5,900
1949 112,765 107 ,000 2,765 3,000
1950 76,525 67,500 6,225 2,800
1951 203,640 192,000 9 , 040 2,600
1952 210,210 197,100 7,910 5,200
1953 215,321 201,380 7,741 6,200
1954 320,737 309,033 4,704 7,000
1955 411 ,966 398,650 6,616 6,700
1956 459,850 445,197 7,563 6,700 390
.1957 452,205 436,049 8,171 7,300 685
1958 447,513 432,857 7,441 6,900 315
1959 455,420 437,643 8,772 8,600 405
1960 334,729 315,846 9,820 8,200 863
1961 310,375 291,420 10,315 8,600 40
--')2 217,010 194,978 12,928 8,700 404
. ">3 209,218 186,865 12,930 8,500 923
1964 200,022 177 ,736 14,361 7,900 25
1965 35,871 20,284 10,917 4,670 0
1966 24,080 8,647 11,194 3,683 0 477
1967 23,959 6,125 13,578 3,900 0 356
1968 13,704 0 10,723 2,600 0 381
1969 16,221 0 13,530 2,300 0 391
1970 17,937 0 15,470 2 ,004 0 463
1971 14,235 0 12,143 1 ,54 1 0 551
1972 12,847 0 11 ,419 1 , 107 0 321
1973 13,551 0 11,712 1,458 0 331
1974 14, 197 0 11,625 1,250 0 322
1975 12,426 0 11,245 970 0 211
1976 12,325 0 11 ,568 572 0 185
1977 12,266 0 11,661 399 0 206
1978 11 , 581 0 10,955 312 0 274
1979 12,791 0 12,246 237 0 258
Note a: Due to carryover of workersfrom one year to another, the number of workers
admitted each year is generally lo\'Jer than the actual nU:~ibel'sof persons employed
during peak harvest seasons.
Sources: Data for the years 1942 through 1972 are frorn United States Senate, Committee
on the Judiciary, "The ~"'est Indies (B:.II) Temporary Alien ~Jorker Progt'am 1943-1977,"
(HashinCjton: U.S. Governl::ent Printing Office, 1973), Table 2', p. 27; Data frOil! 1973
throu'Jh 1979 at'e fforil the U.S. Department of Justice .Statistical Yearbook of ttl~
Inu:liql'Jtion and ~~aturalizJtion Set'vice, 1979, Table 18.
-----
6million braceros were annually working in the agricultural labor market of the
Southwest. The availability of Mexican workers significantly depressed existing
wage levels in some regions; modulated wage increases that would have occurred
in their absence; and sharply compressed the duration of the employment period
for which many citizens farm workers could find jobs.7 The thorough report
on the bracero program by the President's Commission on Migratory Labor in
1952 found, with respect to wage trends for agricultural workers during the
bracero era, "that wages by States were inversely related to the supply of
alien 1abor.,,8 Citizen farmworkers in the Southwest simply could not compete
with braceros. Braceros were captive workers who were totally subject to the
unilateral demands of employers made them especially appealing to many employers.
There were also extensive charges of abuse by employers as most of the provisions
for the protection of wage rates and working conditions were either ignored
or circumvented.9 The bracero program was also a significant factor in the
rapid exodus of rural Chicanos between 1950 and 1970 to urban labor markets
where they were often poorly prepared to find employment and housing.10
The drive to repeal P.L. 78 was led by the AFL-CIO, various Chicano groups,
and an array of other community organizations generally concerned with the
welfare of low income workers. Believing that in southwestern agriculture,
lithe prevailing wage was in fact set by the braceros themselves" rather than
by domestic labor market factors, the Kennedy Administration promised in 1961
that much tighter administrative regulations would be imposed. Beginning in
mid-1962, the Department of Labor set an "adverse-effect wage rate" for each
state. These were minimumwage rates which the Department determined had to
be paid to prevent braceros from adversely affecting (i.e., undercutting) what
would otherwise be market-determined wages for citizen agricultural workers.
In most cases, the adverse wage rates were set higher than the prevailing wages.
7The adverse wage, however, had to be offered to citizen workers if the
agricultural employer intended to seek foreign workers. Under these terms,
the bracero program lost much of its attractiveness to employers. The bitter
political struggle over the program came to an end when the program was
terminated as of December 31,1964. The only supporter of the program at the
time was the Department of State which believed that lithe program has been,
beneficial to Mexico" and warned that, if terminated, Mexican workers would
likely continue to come anyhow--a1beit i11ega11y.1l This same conclusion was
drawn by the Mexican government which feared that the braceros had been exposed
to the wages and working conditions of the United States and would be unlikely
to be content with the poorer opportunities at home.12 In fact, the acceleration
in the rate of illegal immigration from Mexico can virtually be dated to the
termination of the bracero program at the end of 1964.
The British West Indies labor Program
Following the precedent set by the Mexican labor Program in 1942, a similar
non-immigrant program was set up to recruit workers from the British West Indies.
The governments of the British West Indies (including Jamaica, St. lucia, St.
Vincent, Dominica and Barbados) and the Bahamas entered into an intergovernmental
agreement with the United States government in April 1943 to supply agricultural
workers which created the British West Indies Program (BWI program). It was
designed as a response to concerns by employers along the entire East Coast
that they too were experiencing wartime manpower shortages. As most BWI workers
spoke English, they had an advantage to employers over the Mexican workers
available in the bracero program.
Like the bracero program, the BWIprogram too was formalized on the basis
of P.L. 45 from 1943 through 1947. Although the aggregate numbers was smal1--
about 24,000 a year--when compared to the bracero program, BWIworkers were
8~ubstantial in the particular agricultural labor markets in which they were
employed.13 The BWI program, however, did permit some employment in non-
agricultural work during the war years.14
From 1947 to 1952, the BWI program was re-converted into a temporary
agricultural worker program as allowed under the Immigration Act of 1917.
The contracts were made on a tripartite basis between U.S. employers, the
foreign workers, and the governments of participating lJest Indian.
A review of the BWI program by the President's Commission on Migratory
Labor in 1952 condemned the administration of the orogram. In particular
it attacked the lack of "vigilance for the protection of living and "lorking
standards" of the workers.15 During the legislative debate over the contin-
uation of the Mexican Labor Program in 1951, East Coast emp10yers--especial1y
those in Florida--requested specifically that the BWIworkers not be included
in the pending bill. They preferred to keep the BWI program under the aus-
pices of the Immigration Act of 1917.
Policy Development: The Post-1952 Experience
In 1952, the nation's immigration law was significantly recodified and
revised by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. This statute did
maintain the principle whereby all persons entering the nation must be classi-
fied as being either immigrants or non-immigrants. But the concept of non-
inmigrants became infinitely more complex. Twelve classes of non-immigrants
are specified. These classes are, in turn, divided into subclasses. An un-
official convention has evolved whereby the individual classes and subclasses
are identified by the letters and numbers of the section of the Act that
created them. Several of the classes cannot work in the United States (e.g.,
visitors for pleasure or aliens in transit); others can work in the United
9States but their work has little or no impact on the U.S. labor market (e.g.,
foreign ambassadors, or officials of international organizations, or rep-
resentatives of foreign news media); and there are those who do work directly
in the labor force.16 Table 2 indicates the non-immigrant categories that
are permitted to work legally and the corresponding number of admissions in
1978 for each classification.
Amongthe non-immigrants who work among the regular labor force, there
are several classifications who are free to change jobs at will. They are
not contractually linked to employers. Amongthese, for instance, are foreign
students who may legally work (F-l workers) in any occupation if they receive
permission from the INS. Most of the other non-immigrants are under some form
of binding contractual obligation to their employers. Among these are H-l
workers (persons who are distinguished merits and ability--as opera singers,
actors, and various professional workers); J-l workers (persons who are exchange
visitors in various international programs); and L-l workers (persons who are
intra-company transferees of multi-national corporations). Most of these workers
are in white collar occupations or other highly skilled jobs.
It is the H-2 program for "other temporary workers,lI however, that has
generated most of the controversy over the years. In quantitative terms, the
largest number of H-2 workers was in 1969 when 69,288 workers were admitted.
Since then, the number has declined and has leveled off at around 23,000 a
year at the end of the 1970s. Table 3 indicates the occupational distribution
of all H-2 workers in 1978. Within the H-2 classification, the largest single
occupation has generally been farm workers.17 As the size of the overall
program has declined, the proportion of the total who are agricultural workers
has risen to over one-third of all H-2 workers.
Classification Number of Persons
Category Group Admitted
Treaty Trader
or Investor E 50.431
Student F-1 187,030
Temporary Uorker
of Distinguished
Abi 1 ity or ~1erit H-1 16,838
Other Temporary
Worker H-2 22,832
Industrial Trainee H-3 3,309
Exchange Visitor J-1 53,319
Finance (ee) of U.S.
Citizen K-1 5,730
Intracompany Transfer l-l 21,495
Total 360,984
10
,
Table 2 NU::1ben:of r~on-Ir;:i71igrants
Admitted to the United States
in Im:nigt'a t i on Catcgor i es
That Are Permitted to Work.
Fiscal Year 1978
Source: U.S. Oepart~ent of Justice Ann~pl Rerort of the In~nioration and
r:Jturali7Jtion Service: 1978 (~':.)shington, D.C., U.S. Govern;:;ent Printing
0 f fie e, 19'19 Tab1e s 16 and 168.
I
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Table 3 Occupations of All rhn-Irr~'T1igrant
B-2 \:od:cl's t,s::li t ted to the
United States During Fiscal Year 1978
Occupation
Professional and Technical
NUr.1ber Admitted
8,406
Sales Horkers
170
103
~~nagers and Administration
Clerical Horkers 135
Craft Workers 2,845
Operatives (except ;n
Transportation) 298
97Transportation Operatives
Non-Farm Laborers 1,585
Farmers and Farm f'1anagers 0
Farm Laborers and Foremen 8,306
Service Workers (except private
household)
Private Household Workers
511
376
Total 22,832
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, A~nua1 RCDort of the Immioration and
t~aturJl iLJtion Service: 1978, (~':ashing:or.-, D.C., U.S. Governrr.ent Printing
Office, 1979.) Table 165.
/.
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The non-agricultural H-2 workers are occupationally dispersed. The
largest group are professional and technical workers. These are generally
persons "of lower status than those entering on H-l visas" or exchange
. .t 18V1Sl ors. The largest number of these are writers, artists, and entertainers
followed by athletes and musicians.
Supposedly, H-2 workers can only be admitted "if unemployed persons capable
of performing such service of labor cannot be found in this country. II It is
up to the Department of Labor to decide whether citizen workers are available.
In making its determination, the system of adverse wage rates and working
conditions is applied. These conditions must be met by any employer who seeks
to hire foreign workers under the H-2 program. The final entry decision, however,
resides not with the Department of Labor but, rather, with the Department of
Justice. Frequently, negative admission decisions by the former have been
overruled by the latter.
H-2 workers do not pay social security taxes which means that the employer
does not deduct the tax from the employee's wage nor does the employer have
to match the tax as is the case with citizen workers. H-2 workers are also
exempt from unemployment compensation taxes on employer payrolls. Hence, an
employer may secure H-2 workers at wage costs that are below those needed to
be paid to citizen workers even when the nominal rates are the same to both.
Although many non-agricultural workers enter under contractual terms that
tie them to specific employers, their wages and working conditions are not
controversial nor are they seen as any threat to citizen workers. The same
cannot be said for the agricultural H-2 workers or for the use of the entire
H-2 worker program in the territories of Guamand the Virgin Islands.
cases require special elaboration.
These
13
Agricultural H-2 Workers
The H-2 program in agriculture incorporates all of the undesirable
features of its lineal heir--the bracero program. Workers are totally
dependent upon their employers. Eligibility to be chosen for the program
often depends upon one's contacts with certain officials of his home govern-
mente It is often considered a privilege to be selected. Corruption in the
selection process is rampant. If chosen, the worker can only be assured of
the opportunity to return again if his work and attitude please the u.s.
employer. This is because the employer may IIrequest by namell a set proportion
(usually 50 percent) of this year's H-2 workers to return the next year.
effect, the workers must compete with one another on terms that are very
In
favorable to the employer. If at any time the worker's demeanor is deemed
unsatisfactory by his employer, the worker may be deported without an appeal.
Given this system, lIit is little wonder that H-2 aliens are 'hard working and
diligent. ,1119
Although there are several countries involved as sources of agricultural
H-2 workers, about 90 percent of their annual numbers are from the British
West Indies (predominately from Jamaica). Their involvement as H-2 workers
represents a continuation of the aforementioned BWIlabor program. The BWI
workers were assumed into the H-2 program that began in 1952. Throughout the
1950s, the use of BWIworkers increased (see Table I) but, when compared to
the co-existing bracero program, the BWI was dwarfed in size. Hence, the BWI
program escaped close scrutiny. When the bracero program was phased out in
the early 1960s, attention turned to the BWIprogram. For despite differences
in their legislative authorizations, the programs were so similar in their
structure that the same arguments that led to the termination of the bracero
program seemed logically to apply to the BWI program. The Department of Labor
14
did issue more restrictive regulations in the early 1960s and again in the
late 1970s for all H-2 workers.
The employers of H-2 agricultural workers have contended that the major
alternative to H-2 workers is illegal immigrants. There have been illegal
immigrants involved in East Coast agriculture but the incidence is believed
to be much less than has been the case in agriculture in the Southwest. The
East Coast employers claim that it was the termination of the bracero program
in the Southwest in 1964 that has led to the widespread use of illegal immigrants
in that region.20 They also contend that it is difficult to attract citizen
workers to these seasonal occupations.21
The H-2 Program on the Virgin Islands
The series of 50 islands that comprise the Virgin Islands have belonged
to the United States since their purchase from" Denmark in 1917.
an unincorporated territory whose native born are U.S. citizens.
They are
Prior to
1917, a practice of free travel to find employment was permitted among the
Caribbean Islands. When the United States purchased the islands, this prac-
tice continued until 1938 when the U.S. government ruled that the prevailing
immigration statutes applied to the islands. All aliens who resided in the
islands as of 1938 were ruled to be legal resident aliens. During World War II,
there was a need for unskilled workers to build up the defense forces on the
island of St. Thomas to protect the Panama Canal. The word spread throughout
the nearby French and British islands and large numbers of people sailed to
St. Thomas in the illegal search for jobs. For various reasons of expediency,
they were permitted to stay.
proved unsuccessful.
Later efforts to force these people to leave
15
With the enactment of the H-2 provisions in 1952, the groundwork was laid
for the ratification of the process that had already begun. Beginning in 1956,
a temporary worker agreement was reached between the United States and the
nearby British Virgin Islands. In 1959, the agreement was geographically extended
to include the many other islands of the British, French, and Dutch West Indies.
These H-2 workers were supposed to be employed only in the agricultural and
tourist industries. There were nominal efforts made to see if citizen workers
were available but, in fact, by the early 1960s, admission was permitted "for
any jOb.,,22 By the end of the 1960s, "alien labor constituted roughly half
of the Virgin Islands labor force.,,23 Before long, problems of housing, education,
and social conditions for H~2 workers had become so "terrible" that the H-2
workers had become "the biggest single problem" on the is1ands.24 It was even
feared that if there was a change in status from H-2 workers to resident aliens
that the native-born population could lose political control of the islands.
By the 1970s, it was obvious to the Department of Labor that lithe non-
immigrant aliens virtually determined the prevailing wage in many occupations.,,25
The Department, therefore, issued indefinite labor certifications to these H-2
workers and allowed them to change jobs freely. There would no longer be any
effort made to see if citizen workers were available. All pretense of the
existence of a temporary work program was abandoned.
The Guam Labor Program
The island of Guam was ceded to the United States in 1898 as part of the
treaty ending the Spanish-American War. Citizenship to residents of Guam was
extended in 1950. Because of its strategic location in the mid-Pacific, it
has remained a key military installation for the United States. The Invnigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 was the first immigration statute to apply to Guam.
During World War II, Guam was devastated. When the rebuilding process
16
began, many residents of Guam sought jobs with the federal government because
the private economy had been virtually destroyed. It was against this back-
drop that efforts to import non-immigrant labor for a wide variety of jobs
began. The largest number of these foreign workers were admitted to do con-
struction work. In May, 1947, workers from the Philippines and other islands
were hired under short term contracts. The authority for the contracts was
merely an exchange of intergovernmental notes.26 No attempt was made to reconcile
this program with existing immigration laws until 1952 when the status of the
contract workers came into immediate conflict with the newly enacted H-2
provisions. Not only were these workers in a variety of occupations but many
had been in Guamfor a number of years. Clearly, they vlere not "temporary
workers. II Nonetheless, accepting the contention of the u.s. Navy that they were
needed for defense purposes, the INS approved the granting of blanket H-2
status to all of these foreign workers in 1953.
On the island, a "triple wage system" developed: a hi gh wage for
"statesiders"; a medium wage for native residents of Guam; and a low wage for
H-2 workers evolved.27 Criticism mounted that H-2 workers on Guamwere receiving
"slave wages". There were also charges of extensive racketeering among the
labor recruiters in the Philippines involving wage kickbacks and bribery in
the selection process. Consequently, the INS announced in 1958 that the
program for non-defense employers--who were working in every occupation from
doctors and accountants to cooks and mechanics--would be phased-out.
In 1960, INS also decided to end the H-2 defense worker program. It
feared that the H-2 arrangement was becoming a permanent part of the Guam
economy and that few efforts were being made to train citizen workers for the
jobs that H-2 workers held. In its place, however, non-immigrant workers
continued to be admitted under the separate parole authority given to the At-
torney General under the Inmigration and Nationality Act to admit persons
17
temporarily for "emergent reasons" or to be in the "public interest.,,28 Thus,
to meet the requests of defense contractors and the military on the island,
non-immigrants from the Philippines were again admitted. The practice continued
until 1975. A second parole program was also instituted in 1962 for temporary
workers to do reconstruction work after the island was hit by a severe typhoon.
This program was terminated in May 1970 when it was decided that the H-2
program was more appropriate for construction workers than the parole procedures.29
The revival of the H-2 program came in response to employer claims of
labor shortages in the expanding tourist industry in particular and the growth
in the island's population in general. The government of Guamalso sought
H-2 workers as a means of developing new industries--especially in agriculture
and fishing.
these years.
Many fewer H-2 workers were admitted than were requested in
It was during the 1970s that recognition of the long existing
problem that many H-2 workers were not complying with the terms of their adnlis-
. 11 1 .. t 30sion surfaced. In other words, H-2 workers were becoming 1 ega lmmlgran s.
By 1977 a Department of Labor report on labor market conditions on Guam
described them as being "abysmal.,,31 The report noted that by 1976 one-
sixth of the island's civilian labor force were H-2 workers. Moreover, H-2
workers composed 82 percent of persons employed in construction, 47 percent
in agriculture and 15 percent in manufacturing.32 With reference to the working
conditions, the report cited numerous examples of worker abuse by employers
and labor recruiters. It also detailed the inability of the Department to
enforce existing labor standards in an environment in which many workers were
completely beholden to their employers. The H-2 workers, in these circumstances,
had become preferred workers for employers. Citizen workers could not compete
with them on their terms. Hence, citizens often became unemployed. As the
report noted, "alien workers constitute such a large proportion of the work
18
force that the wages at which they are certified are the prevailing wage rates.,,33
It noted that the wages and working conditions were not being set by a free
market but rather were the result of government policies.
A New Role For Non Immigrant Workers
Beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the early 1980s, a new role
has been suggested for non-immigrant labor policy. As the illegal immigration
surfaced as a national issue, it was suggested by many persons that a non-
immigrant program should be included among the policy options to overcome this
problem. In a sense, of course, illegal immigrants constitute a form of non-
immigrant labor--albeit totally unregulated. It was suggested, therefore, by
an array of scholars that either a new non-immigrant labor program be created
or that the existing H-2 program be greatly expanded in an effort to absorb
and to legalize the work done by many illegal immigrants.34
Implicit in all of the proposals was the assumption that most illegal
immigrants do work that citizen workers shun. Therefore, implicitly, it was
argued that the non-immigrant workers would not affect the wages and working
conditions of citizen workers since they wou1d--by virtual definition--not
compete for the same jobs. None of these proposals contained any historical
review of the past experiences with such proposals. As a result, they are all
merely conceptual programmatic sketches. None scratched the surface of such
critical issues as how the workers are to be recruited; what are their
job entitlements; what are the limitations to be placed on employer prerogatives
to limit exploitation; what means are to be used to test for job certification;
and what protections are to be included for citizen workers and for unions
to assure that prevailing standards are not undermined. Moreover, none of
them touched the critical question of who would administer the program.
19
In August 1977, the Carter Administration included among its comprehensive
immigration reform package an explicit charge that the H-2 program would be
given a comprehensive review.35 Although explicitly denying any interest in a
bracero program, the implication was that an expanded temporary work program
might meet the needs of some employers while not adversely affecting citizen
workers. In response, the Commission for Manpower Policy advised the President
that it was "strong1y against" any expanded H-2 program.36
Rather than act directly upon the Carter Administration's immigration
proposals, Congress established the Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy to study all dimensions of the nation's immigration policy.
In its subsequent report, the Commission acknowledged that the H-2 program has
been the source of significant criticism. Nevertheless, the Select Commission
concluded that lIa continuation of the program is necessary and preferable to
the institution of a new one. 1137 Several suggestions were made to IIstream1ine"
the administration of the program. It recommended that employers be required
to pay both social security and unemployment compensation payroll taxes on all
H-2 workers in order to remove "inducements to hire H-2 workers over U.S.
workers."38 The Commission specifically concluded that there should not be
any new temporary worker program established as part of any strategy to combat
. . t . 39illegal lmmlgra 10n.
By the time the Select Commission issued its report in 1981, the Reagan
Administration had taken office. It formed a task force chaired by the Attorney
General to study the Commission's recommendations. When the task force released
its response on July 1981, no mention was made of the H-2 program but it did
propose that a new "experimenta1 temporary worker program for Mexican nationa1s11
be established.40 The "pilot program II would be for a two year trial period
and would be limited to 50,000 workers each year. It was understood at the
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time that the Reagan Administration hoped that pilot programs would prove the
viability of the concept and that the program could be expanded to a million
or so workers in subsequent years.41
In response to the Select Commission's Report and as the Reagan Admin-
istration's proposals, extensive congressional hearings were held in the Fall
1982 on all facets of the nation's immigration policy. As a result a bipartisan
bill called the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982 was introduced.
With regard to non-immigrant policy, the bill omitted any reference for a new
foreign worker program.42 A number of administrative changes were recommended
for the H-2 program. No H-2 worker could be in the country more than 11
months in any calendar year. The Attorney General could not approve a petition
for H-2 workers without a certification by the Secretary of Labor that citizen
workers are unavailable at the time and place they are needed and no citizen
workers will be adversely effected. An expedited review procedure is also outlined.
An Assessment of the "New"
Role for Non-Immigrant
labor Programs
As should be apparent from the review of the evolution of non-immigrant
labor policy, proposals to use it as a means of combatting illegal immigration
(a labor supply problem) is a departure from its historic role (as a labor
demand pol icy) . Such interest in non-immigrant worker programs is not based
on the existence of a demonstrated need for such workers. The proposals for
new or expanded non-immigrant labor programs are designed to supply more workers
for unskilled and semi-skilled occupations in primarily low wage industries.
These are precisely the same labor markets in which those subgroups of the
labor force with the highest unemployment rates in the nation are already
disproportionately found. No one is suggesting that there be a foreign worker
program to supply more workers for white collar occupations. Not only would
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such proposals lead to charges of a "brain drain" from source nations, but
also the domestic opposition of the privileged and protected workers in these
labor markets could be counted upon to kill any such idea at the moment of
its conception.
As is also the case the job-holding patterns of illegal immigrants,
there is no evidence at all that citizen workers will not do the work that
non-immigrants do. This fundamental point is asserted without a modicum of
empirical evidence by those advocates who support new or expanded non-immigrant
work programs.43 For the contentions of the advocates of new or expanded
non-immigrant worker programs to be valid, they must be willing to argue that
there will be too few citizen workers available no matter what are the wages or
benefits associated with certain occupations in the American economy. No one
can seriously argue this point when it is refuted in everyday practice by
millions of low wage citizen workers who are already working in all of the
same industries for which non-immigrant workers would be sought. The U.S.
Department of labor estimated that in 1981 there were 29 million workers (or
30 percent of the employed labor force) who were employed in lithe kinds of
low-skilled industrial, service, and agricultural jobs in which illegal aliens
typically seek employment.1I44 It was also estimated that 10.5 million workers
were receiving the federal minimumwage ($3.35 an hour) and that an additional
10 million workers were receiving only 30-40 cents per hour more than the
. . 45
mlnlmum wage.
The presence of non-immigrant workers not only affects job opportunities
but also wage levels in any given labor market. It is these wage effects that
are part of the attractiveness of both non-immigrant workers and illegal immi-
grants to American employers. Employers are able to obtain workers in selected
labor markets at less cost than would be the case in their absence. It is
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also probable that foreign workers in low wage American industries are less
likely to make demands for job rights or to join unions.
Another flaw in these proposals is their intended magnitude. A foreign
worker program cannot do anything to reduce illegal immigration unless the
program is significant in size (at least in the 500,000 to 750,000 person range
each year). But the larger the program, the greater the likelihood of adverse
impact on citizen workers in selected labor markets. On the other hand, if
the scale of the program is small, where will the deterrence to illegal entry
be? Politically if not economically speaking, there must be some limitations
on the size of the program. If there is, what will stop others who are not
selected from coming or others whose period of work has expired but who wish
to remain from staying? A new or expanded non-immigrant labor program does
not resolve any of the prevailing problems with the nation's immigration
policies while it adds a host of new ones.
Moreover, most of the proponents of new non-immigrant programs assume
either implicitly--or explicitly in the case of the Reagan plan--that the
program would be a bilateral arrangement with Mexico. This was feasible during
the bracero program era. But times have changed in both Mexico and the United
States. Illegal immigrants are streaming into the United States from many
countries other than Mexico. If the program was open only to Mexicans, it
would do nothing to reduce other problems from these other nations who, col-
lectively, represent about one-half of all illegal immigrants. As many of
these other illegal immigrants are blacks and Asians, it is very unlikely that
any foreign worker program could be restricted to workers only from Mexico.
If it was, it would appear to be a racist proposal design to favor the people
of only one nation.
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One specific study has sought to examine the alleged need for foreign
workers from the viewpoint of United States employers.46 Conducted in San
Diego, California, in 1981, it sought to discover if employers could not pay
competitive wages for citizen workers in industries in which illegal immigrants
were widely used. Employers in agriculture, restaurants, and electronic
manufacturing in San Diego were interviewed. Consistently, the employers
expressed admiration of illegal immigrant workers over citizen workers. Many
agricultural employers lauded the former braceros that they once were able to
employ. But rather than rely simply on the attitudes of employers, the study
also sought to investigate whether it was true that employers would be forced
to go out of business (or, in the case of electronic manufacturing, would they
relocate south of the border) if they had to compete actively for citizen
workers. Employers were not asked if they were willing to pay a prevailing
wage, but, rather, "at what wage would you go out of business if you had to
raise wages in order to attract U.S. workers?" The conclusion of the study was
that the ceiling wage as indicated by employers was high enough to attract
citizen workers but that the employers preferred foreign workers and that dis-
placement was occurring in the San Diego labor market.47 Hence, the study
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concluded that "a foreign-worker program would simply legitimize this strategy. II
There is also other pernicious long run effects of non-immigrant labor
programs in low wage industries. Namely, when workers come from economically
less developed countries to the United States, they are made aware of op-
portunities that for many were beyond their previous imagination. The rel-
atively higher wages and the broader array of job opportunities will cause
many to find ways to remain. Rather than being an alternative to illegal
immigration, these policies can become a method that fosters the phenomenon.
It should not be surprising, that among the strongest voices in opposition
to proposals to expand temporary worker programs have been those from groups
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most closely associated with the protection of opportunities for low wage
workers. For example, a 1979 conference on "Jobs for Hispanics"--sponsored
by the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement and attended by both
Hispanic trade unionists and Hispanic community groups from across the country--
took a strong and unanimous stand against a foreign worker program. In their
conference manifesto, called the "Declaration of Albuquerque," they emphatically
stated:
The federal government should not include any type of 'Bracero'
program or foreign labor importatio~as a solution to t he current
problem of undocumented workers.49
Similar strong statements of opposition to any type of new or expanded temporary
foreign worker program were made to the Select Commission by the National
Hispanic Task Force (a group representing eight of the nation's largest Hispanic
organizations), and by such groups as California Rural Legal Assistance, Texas
Rural Legal Aid, Inc., and the National Center for Immigrant's Rights.50 All
of these organizations have had a long and dedicated history of support for
the low income workers who would bear the brunt of the competition for jobs
from foreign temporary workers.
When the Reagan Administration announced in 1981 its support for a new
foreign worker program, it was met by a chorus of opposition. It could have
been anticipated that the AFL-CIOwould attack the proposal as being a mechanism
for employers to find "a docile and controllable work force."51 It was
unexpected, however, that the Mexican labor movement, the Confederacion de
Trabojadores de Mexico (CTM) would also strongly condemn the idea. In a
"Manifesto to the People", the president of CTM,Fidel Velasquez, said that
the Reagan proposal would convert Mexican workers into "the biggest strategic
labor reserve in contemporary history, subject to super-exploitation and
servitude."52 The fact that CTMis an intergal part of the Party of Revolutionary
25
Institutions (PRI) that has singularly controlled Mexican political affairs
since the time of the Mexican revolution meant implicitly that it was speaking
for the Mexican government. Officially, the Mexican government did not comment
on the Reagan proposal but it is inconceivable that CTMwould speak out publicly
in opposition to the plan if it did not represent the consensus view of PRI.
Concluding Observations
There are features of the nation's non-immigrant labor policies that are
both logical and beneficial to the economy and the quality of life of the
nation. Yet within the broad dimensions of non-immigrant labor policy there
has also been a programmatic history that is not so easy to rationalize. It
has usually involved the employment of less skilled and less talented workers
than are generally available within the American labor force but who are,
nonetheless, similar in their employment capabilities to certain large segments
of the American labor force. In these instances, the sanguine attitude surrounding
non-immigrant labor policy is challenged. For as the history of these endeavors
reveals, there has been a persistant theme of misuse and abuse of these programs.
Because these non-immigrant workers are unskilled and from relatively impoverished
backgrounds, they are often easy prey for corrupt selection processes in foreign
nations over which the United States has little control. Once in the United
States, these workers are often subject to working conditions that they may
perceive to be desirable (relative to the alternatives in their homelands) but
which affect the attractiveness of the jobs to citizen workers. To the degree
that the prevailing working standards begin to reflect the presence of the
non-immigrant workers in these specific labor markets rather than those of
the general labor market, citizen workers gravitate elsewhere and become less
available. Employers soon become not only dependant on non-immigrant workers
but, also, come to prefer non-immigrants.
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As a predictable consequence, non-immigrant programs for less skilled
and less talented workers are consistently implemented under the guise of being
temporary worker programs. But, as past experience in the United States and
in Europe have demonstrated, these programs for low wage workers become long
term sources of labor supply. 53 They become an institutionalized phenomena
that exerts a narcotic influence on all parties involved in the employment
process. Employers, foreign workers, and source countries become addicted.
The rationale for their existence becomes lost in the reasoning process
that justifies their continuation over time. Originally, non-immigrant programs
were created only during war emergency periods but they traditionally continued
long after the wars were over. With the advent of the H-2 program, they have
become a feature of peace time too and there have been persistent proposals
to expand their size and scope.
Non-immigrant worker programs in low wage industries have been of interest
to employers primarily as a means of reducing their costs of production and
enhancing their control over their workers. Non-immigrant low-wage workers
are attractive largely because of their dependency upon their employers. Citizen
workers who compete with these non-immigrant workers find that their existing
work conditions usually either become frozen or decline. Under few circumstances
will they improve. Efforts to establish unions are made more difficult.
Thus, non-immigrant labor policy can be seen to be a topic that has played
a long and often controversial role in American immigration policy. It is
likely that it will continue to do so. It is to be hoped, however, that their
usage will be limited and constantly monitored. Certainly there is nothing
in the programmatic history of such endeavors that would warrant their expansion
under the pretext of being an alternative to illegal immigration.
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